Splitsville: the economics of unilateral divorce by Kristie M. Engemann & Michael T. Owyang
A 
common perception in the United States  
  is that half of all marriages will end in 
divorce.  While this may be true today, it was 
not always the case.  The chart on Page 14 
shows that the number of divorces for every 
1,000 people rose steadily from 1960 to the 
early 1980s and has since somewhat declined.  
The rise in this divorce rate coincided with the 
time when many states modified their laws, 
allowing divorce to be initiated unilaterally.  
Divorce laws began to change in 1970 when 
California adopted no-fault divorce; the rest 
of the country followed suit over the next 15 
years.  No-fault divorce allowed the courts 
to dissolve marriages based on, for example, 
irreconcilable differences rather than requir-
ing the fault of one spouse (e.g., because of 
adultery).  Additionally, more than half of the 
states adopted unilateral divorce during this 
time, meaning a divorce no longer required the 
mutual consent of both spouses.
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Altering the family structure—by making 
divorce easier to obtain—may have economic 
implications, as well as social consequences.  
Several studies have explored the effects of 
such changes in divorce laws on a variety of 
economic outcomes, some of which we discuss.  
Among the findings:  The presence of unilateral 
divorce may have led to an increase in mar-
ried women’s labor supply, to a decline in the 
average educational attainment of girls and to 
changes in various rates of spousal violence. 
In our discussion of these studies, we focus 
on the effects of enacting unilateral divorce law 
rather than instituting no-fault divorce.
The Divorce Rate
Perhaps the most obvious impact of enact-
ing unilateral divorce is its effect on the divorce 
rate.  Economist Leora Friedberg used data 
spanning 1968 to 1988 to examine such effects.  
Controlling for the year and state, she found 
that unilateral divorce laws increased the 
divorce rate by nearly 10 percent of the average 
over the entire sample period (which was 4.6 
divorces per 1,000 people).  She also found that 
different separation requirements and property 
settlement rules in states with unilateral divorce 
affected the rate of dissolution differently.  
For example, unilateral divorce laws with no 
requirement of separation before divorcing and 
no-fault property division were associated with 
the largest increase in divorce—almost 12 per-
cent of the average divorce rate.  On the other 
hand, laws that required no separation but did 
have fault property division increased divorces 
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period of separation raised the rate by less than 5 
percent.  Overall, Friedberg found that unilateral 
divorce contributed 17 percent of the increase in 
the overall divorce rate during her data sample.       
Economist Justin Wolfers arrived at a differ-
ent conclusion, arguing that Friedberg’s results 
overstate the effect of the unilateral divorce laws 
on the divorce rate.  Whereas Friedberg estimated 
the impact of the laws over her entire sample, 
Wolfers broke up the effect into two-year incre-
ments.  He reasoned that, by examining two-year 
increments and extending the sample to 1956 to 
1988, he captured only trends that existed before 
the laws were enacted.  Using the same model as 
Friedberg with only the aforementioned change 
in sample, Wolfers found that, for the first eight 
years after a state adopted unilateral divorce, the 
increase in the divorce rate was two-thirds the 
size of Friedberg’s finding.  Furthermore, Wolfers 
showed that after 10 years, unilateral divorce 
had negligible effects on the divorce rate.  This 
is in direct contrast to Friedberg’s assertion that 
the laws had a permanent effect on the divorce 
rate.  Both studies, however, agree that unilateral 
divorce caused some increase in divorce rates, at 
least in the short term.
Married Women’s Labor Supply
Unilateral divorce may also have an effect on 
married women’s incentives to enter the work 
force.  Economist Jeffrey Gray argued that a state’s 
marital property law may influence the degree to 
which unilateral divorce laws affected a woman’s 
labor market decisions.  (See the sidebar at right 
for an overview of the property division rules 
and their potential effects on bargaining power.)  
Using data from several sources, Gray compared 
married women aged 18-55 who lived in states 
that adopted unilateral divorce between 1970 and 
1974 with women living in states that did not.  
Gray found that, after controlling for the type 
of property law and other variables that may influ-
ence a woman’s decision to work (e.g., age, educa-
tion, number of children, husband’s income), 
her bargaining power affected her tendency to 
work.  A married woman in a unilateral divorce 
state with a community-property law—meaning 
she would get half of all marital property upon 
divorce—saw her bargaining power increase and 
was more likely to work outside the home than a 
woman in a state without unilateral divorce.  In 
contrast, a woman in a unilateral divorce state that 
had a common-property law—meaning she would 
retain only her own property—saw her bargain-
ing power decrease and became less likely to work 
in the labor market than a married woman not 
in a unilateral divorce state.  These results might 
indicate women’s preferences of working outside 
the home and men’s preferences of having a wife 
who works in the home.
A variety of other factors, such as whether a 
couple has children, can also influence whether 
she enters the labor force.  A study by economists 
Katie Genadek, Wendy Stock and Christiana 
Stoddard considers which married women 
increased their labor force participation (LFP) 
between 1960 and 1990.  The authors compared 
the labor market decisions of married mothers 
in states that adopted unilateral divorce laws 
with all other married women.  The economists’ 
theory was that the new divorce laws would 
transfer bargaining power from the mother to the 
father—regardless of the state’s property division 
law—because wives with children typically have 
more marriage-specific capital (e.g., from child-
rearing) and less labor market capital than their 
husbands do.  This might reduce wives’ ability 
to initiate divorce since it reduces their outside 
earning opportunities.  In order to reclaim some 
of that bargaining power, wives were more likely 
to enter the labor force.
After accounting for state, year, demographics 
and income variables, Genadek, Stock and Stod-
dard found that married women with young chil-
dren responded most to a change in divorce laws.  
For married women with a child under the age of 
2, the net effect was an increase in their LFP rate 
by 2.1 percentage points, relative to nonmothers.  
When their youngest child was between 2 and 5 
years old, women had a participation rate that was 
1.6 percentage points higher.  The authors found 
a similar increase in weeks worked the previous 
year by married mothers of young children.  
The type of property law also played a role in 
women’s LFP.  Married women with children 
under the age of 6 increased their participation 
more for equitable distribution than for other 
types of property allotment laws.  Community 
property produced the second-highest increase in 
married women’s participation in the labor force.
Hence, in the states with unilateral divorce laws, 
the increase in the LFP of married women with 
young children implies that easier divorce would 
have left them worse off due to the cost of raising 
children.  By entering the labor force, these women 
were able to increase their bargaining power in the 
marriage (by raising their threat of leaving).
Dividing Property 
Some of the studies also 
explore the effects of different 
property division rules sub-
sequent to divorce.  The three 
types of division are community 
property, common law and 
equitable distribution. 
1,2,3 
Community property laws 
distribute equally upon divorce 
all property acquired during  
the marriage.  Under common 
law, property is retained by  
the owner upon divorce; in 
cases of joint ownership, the 
property is divided equally 
between the spouses.  Equi-
table distribution leaves it up 
to the court to determine fair 
allotment of the property.  
Let’s Bargain 
Because unilateral divorce made 
dissolution of marriages easier, 
people’s economic decision-
making both prior and subse-
quent to divorce might depend 
on which property law prevailed 
in their state.  Bargaining 
power within a marriage might 
also be affected.  For example, 
a wife’s threat of leaving the 
marriage might increase if her 
state has a community-property 
law because she would get half 
of everything.  In contrast, her 
threat of leaving might decrease 
if her state has a common law 
because, typically, husbands 
own more property, thus leaving 
the woman worse off financially.  
In the first case, the wife’s 
bargaining power increases,  
and in the second,  
it decreases. They instead began to focus more on their 
own careers, perhaps as insurance in the 
event of marriage dissolution.
Children’s Outcomes
A common concern regarding divorce is 
the potential negative effect it has on children.   
Economists John Johnson and Christopher 
Mazingo explored the effects on children’s 
outcomes as adults when they were born in 
states with unilateral divorce laws.  Using data 
from the 1980 census, Johnson and Mazingo 
found that, for each additional year a child 
lived in a state with such laws, his or her 
parents were 0.6 percentage points more likely 
to divorce.  To determine how this affected 
children, Johnson and Mazingo examined 
individuals aged 25-34 during the 1990 
census—those who were children at the time 
unilateral divorce was enacted.  The authors 
compared the outcomes of children born in 
states that adopted unilateral divorce between 
1969 and 1977 and those in states that did not. 
Accounting for the number of years 
exposed to unilateral divorce laws before age 
18, Johnson and Mazingo found that edu-
cational attainment was negatively affected, 
more so for women than for men.  The largest 
effect was on women with nine to 12 years of 
exposure to unilateral divorce, who obtained, 
on average, 0.12 fewer years of school.  Addi-
tionally, those same women were less likely 
to graduate from high school (1.4 percentage 
points), to obtain an associate’s degree (3.2 
percentage points) and to obtain a bachelor’s 
degree (2.3 percentage points).  For men, the 
only significant effect was on high school 
graduation—men with nine to 12 years of 
exposure were two percentage points less 
likely to graduate from high school.
Although women’s wages were negatively 
affected by increased exposure to unilateral 
divorce laws, men’s wages were not signifi-
cantly different.  Again, women with nine to 
12 years of exposure experienced the largest 
negative outcomes, earning 3.7 percent less 
than women who lived in states that did not 
enact unilateral divorce laws.
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Johnson and Mazingo also studied whether 
exposure to unilateral divorce laws influ-
enced a child’s future decisions to marry/
divorce and to have children.  When analyz-
ing their full sample of data, Johnson and 
Mazingo found that both men and women 
SOURCE: U.S. National Center for Health Statistics; obtained from various editions of Statistical Abstract of the United States (2000, 1995, 1984, 
1969) and the U.S. Census Bureau web site: www.census.gov/compendia/statab/tables/07s0119.xls
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A change in divorce laws can affect 
whether a couple decides to invest in 
marriage-specific capital, which is the subject 
of a study by Betsey Stevenson.  An example 
of marriage-specific capital occurs when one 
spouse specializes in household production 
while the other focuses on market produc-
tion.  Stevenson posited that unilateral 
divorce leads to, on average, shorter marriage 
durations and, therefore, reduces the incen-
tive for a couple to make such investments.  
To determine what effect unilateral divorce 
had on several forms of capital, Stevenson 
examined newlywed couples—those who 
had been married for two years or less—from 
the 1970 and 1980 censuses.  She compared 
couples in states that adopted new divorce 
laws between 1970 and 1980 with those in 
states that did not.  Her study accounted 
for various factors that might affect marital 
capital investment, such as the year, state of 
residence, length of marriage, race, ethnicity, 
whether the couple lived in a metropolitan 
area, property division laws that accom-
panied divorce, and both spouses’ age and 
education.  Stevenson found that, in the pres-
ence of unilateral divorce laws, the likelihood 
that one spouse financially supported the 
other for education during the first two years 
of marriage was 10 percent lower.  The couple 
was also 8 percent less likely to have children 
within that time frame.  Additionally, both 
spouses were 8 percent more likely to hold 
full-time jobs, and the woman was 5 percent 
more likely to be in the labor force.
Her results suggest that when divorce 
became easier, couples became less likely to 
invest in elements related to their marriage.  
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as children were significantly more likely to 
be married and less likely to have never been 
married at the time of the survey.  Although 
women’s divorce rate was not affected, the 
men were slightly less likely to be divorced.  
Also, growing up in a unilateral divorce state 
increased the likelihood that a woman had 
children.  For the disaggregated groups, only 
women with nine to 12 years of exposure had 
a significantly higher probability of having 
children than women with no exposure.  
Overall, Johnson and Mazingo’s results 
suggest that girls’ educational attainment and 
wages earned as an adult were more nega-
tively affected than boys’ by the adoption of 
unilateral divorce laws during childhood.  
However, the fact that both were more likely 
to marry as adults perhaps suggests that 
easier divorce laws made marriage seem less 
risky or like less of a commitment.   
Spousal Violence
Another unexpected outcome of the adop-
tion of unilateral divorce laws was a change 
in the rates of spousal violence.  Economist 
Thomas Dee examined the annual number 
of spousal homicides across states from 1968 
to 1978 in order to capture the effect of new 
divorce laws.  During his sample, the average 
number of spousal homicides was similar 
for both spouses—19 husbands killed their 
wives and 17 wives killed their husbands per 
state per year.  Dee argued that unilateral 
divorce laws could have had several pos-
sible effects.  First, women could more easily 
dissolve an abusive marriage.  However, the 
property division after divorce could leave 
women worse off financially, which might 
alter one or both spouses’ behavior within 
the marriage.  For example, the husband 
might increase his level of abuse.  Addition-
ally, the wife’s incentive to kill her husband 
might increase, whether or not his level of 
abuse changes, if her alternative is to be left 
financially destitute in the wake of divorce.  
To determine which, if any, outcome 
occurred, Dee controlled for the state of 
residence, year and several other factors that 
might influence spousal homicide (e.g., state 
personal income per capita and police officers 
per capita).
3  He found that the adoption of 
unilateral divorce did not cause a significant 
change in the number of husbands who killed 
their wives.  However, he found that the 
number of wives who killed their husbands 
increased by 20 to 26 percent.  Dee then con-
sidered whether the marital property treat-
ment mattered for the number of husbands 
killed by their wives.  He found no effect 
when the state had community-property divi-
sion, which generally favored wives.  How-
ever, when a state had equitable-distribution 
or common-law property treatment, both of 
which tended to favor husbands, the number 
increased by one-fourth to one-third.  In light 
of these results, Dee concluded that spousal 
homicides—in the form of wives killing their 
husbands—increased when the possibility 
of unilateral divorce left wives economically 
disadvantaged.
Economists Betsey Stevenson and Justin 
Wolfers also examined the effect of unilateral 
divorce on spousal homicide.  Whereas Dee 
studied the number of spousal homicides, 
Stevenson and Wolfers considered the rate 
of spousal homicide from 1968 to 1994 and 
found different results.  They also controlled 
for various economic, demographic and 
social policy factors, as well as criminal 
justice indicators.  Stevenson and Wolfers, 
contrary to Dee, found no significant change 
in the rate of husbands killed by their wives.  
In contrast, unilateral divorce appeared to 
reduce the rate at which wives were killed by 
their husbands by 12.6 percent.  
Stevenson and Wolfers also examined how 
unilateral divorce affected the rates of domes-
tic violence and suicide.  Using domestic 
violence data from the Family Violence Sur-
veys in 1976 and 1985, Stevenson and Wolfers 
found that the rate of husband-on-wife 
violence decreased by about 36 percent during 
their sample, but the rate of wife-on-husband 
violence did not change significantly.
4  
For suicide rates, they used data from the 
National Center for Health Statistics for 1964 
to 1996.  After controlling for the state and 
year, as well as for economic, demographic 
and social policy factors, the rate of female 
suicide decreased by an average of 8.3 percent 
over the 20 years after the adoption of unilat-
eral divorce laws.
5  The effects were larger as 
more time passed—the rate had decreased by 
16.4 percent 19 or more years after the laws 
had been passed.  Overall—and contrary to 
endnotes
 1 Background information on changing divorce 
laws and data on which states adopted unilat-
eral divorce (which excludes states that have 
unilateral divorce but require a separation 
period first) were obtained from Friedberg 
(1998). 
 2 All regressions include a control for state of 
residence except for the one involving level of 
education.  The results here from the regres-
sion involving wages do not include controls 
for education because it is also affected by the 
divorce laws.   
 3 Additional factors are the unemployment 
rate, welfare aid per recipient, population, 
whether the state had the death penalty and 
the homicide rate by strangers.
 4 The surveys were conducted by sociologists 
Murray Straus and Richard Gelles and only in 
those two years.  Stevenson and Wolfers noted 
that only intact marriages were examined.  As 
a result, the decline in violence could partly 
reflect an increase in divorce among abusive 
couples.
 5 There was no significant effect on the male 
suicide rate.
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the study by Dee—Stevenson and Wolf-
ers’ study suggests that adults’ well-being 
improved after states adopted unilateral 
divorce laws.       
For Better … or Worse?
These studies demonstrate that unilateral 
divorce laws may have important economic 
and social consequences.  Combined with 
laws that determine how property is distrib-
uted after divorce, laws that ease the require-
ments for marriage dissolution can alter 
marital dynamics by changing incentives and 
shifting bargaining power between spouses.  
Some effects of unilateral divorce were posi-
tive—e.g., a reduction in the rate of spousal 
violence—while others were negative—e.g., a 
reduction in the level of education completed 
for girls who grew up in unilateral divorce 
states.  Other outcomes, such as an increase 
in the LFP of mothers with young children, 
have uncertain ramifications. 
See how the number of divorces in each 
state changed over a 25-year period.  Go to 
www.stlouisfed.org/publications/re.
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economy at a Glance
this issue introduces several changes to this Economy at a Glance page.  First, we are now plotting market-based measures  
of long-term inflation expectations.  these are spreads between yields on nominal and inflation-adjusted U.S. treasury 
securities.  Second, to gauge how market expectations of future changes in the federal funds target rate change over 
time, we are now plotting rates on federal funds futures on selected dates.  to make room for these two new charts, we 
have made the U.S. crop and Livestock Prices chart a web-only chart.  to view this chart and additional web-only charts,  
go to www.stlouisfed.org/publications/re.
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NOTE:  Beginning in January 2003, household data reflect revised

















NOTE:  Except for the fed funds target, which is end-of-period,
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NOTE:  Each bar is a one-quarter growth rate (annualized); 
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